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INTRODUCTION 
Civil disobedience is the deliberate violation of the law for a social purpose.1 
According to conventional wisdom, justification for civil disobedience in a democracy 
depends on the existence of majority-trumping considerations, such as divine authority or 
fundamental human rights. Thus, in 2011, when the protestors of Occupy Wall Street 
engaged in civil disobedience to bring attention to economic inequality—a purpose 
unrelated to a majority-trumping consideration—a question of justification arose: If the 
United States functions as a liberal representative democracy, where citizens can legally 
attempt to put an issue on the political agenda through free speech and the ballot box, how 
can civil disobedience that brings attention to this issue be justified without an appeal to a 
majority-trumping consideration? This Article proposes that the civil disobedience of 
Occupy Wall Street was justified as a corrective measure to overcome a “democratic deficit” 
caused by “institutional corruption.” This observation is relevant at this point in time—
more than four years after Occupy Wall Street—because it is now evident that the 
“Occupiers” were both justified in engaging in civil disobedience and successful in putting 
the issue of economic inequality on the political agenda. 
Although civil disobedience has been traditionally justified as an appeal to majority-
trumping considerations, civil disobedience can also be justified as a corrective measure 
when democratic processes break down, even when majority-trumping considerations are 
absent. As Daniel Markovits has explained, democratic processes can misfire, and when 
                                                          
*  Associate, Reed Smith LLP, Pittsburgh, PA; Academic Associate, I∙CONnect. An earlier version of this Article was 
presented at the Harvard Law School Institute for Global Law and Policy Conference on June 1, 2015 and at the 
American Society of Comparative Law YCC Global Conference at Tulane University Law School on March 19, 2016. 
Thanks to Mohamed A. Arafa, Ian M. Hartshorn, Joshua Karton, David Landau, and Stephan Stohler for providing 
helpful feedback on earlier versions of this Article. The author can be reached at mpyingling@gmail.com. 
1  HOWARD ZINN, DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY, NINE FALLACIES ON LAW AND ORDER 39 (1968). 
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they do, individuals lose their ability to effectively engage with their lawmakers, resulting 
in a “democratic deficit.”2 Citizens facing a democratic deficit have no democratic reason 
for accepting public policies or, for that matter, limiting themselves to legal mechanisms 
for generating engagement.3 The existence of a democratic deficit thus justifies civil 
disobedience to instigate engagement and overcome the deficit. 
This Article addresses “institutional corruption” as one particular cause of 
democratic deficits. Institutional corruption—as defined by Lawrence Lessig—is “the 
consequence of an influence within an economy of influence that illegitimately weakens 
the effectiveness of an institution especially by weakening the public trust of the 
institution.”4 Institutional corruption does not necessarily involve bad people who engage 
in bad acts; rather, it often involves good people who are merely part of an institution that, 
as a whole, is unable to fulfill its obligatory purpose as a fiduciary. With respect to 
lawmaking institutions in a representative democracy, the corruption can arise when the 
institution develops a dependence on someone or something other than “[t]he [p]eople.”5 
When this occurs, lawmakers often fail to engage on issues of importance to the people 
and, consequently, the people lose their connection to the sovereign and can no longer 
adopt the will of the sovereign as their own. Thus, as a result of this institutional corruption, 
citizens face a democratic deficit. 
The U.S. Congress is an institution that has developed an improper dependence. 
Even though Congress was designed to be dependent upon the people due to its obligation 
to act for the people as a fiduciary of the people, Congress instead has developed a counter 
dependence on the funders—the economic elite with the ability and willingness to fund 
election campaigns.6 This conclusion is supported by empirical analysis of U.S. policy 
decisions, which shows that when the preferences of economic elite are controlled for, the 
preferences of average Americans have a statistically non-significant impact upon public 
policy.7 In other words, it does not matter whether 5% of average Americans or 95% of 
average Americans support a policy change—the preferences of average Americans for a 
policy change are of no consequence independent of whether the change is also supported 
by the economic elite. 
The institutional corruption of Congress was the backdrop for the civil disobedience 
of Occupy Wall Street. Although the Occupiers initiated the movement primarily to bring 
attention to economic inequality, they also were focused on the underlying cause of this 
                                                          
2  Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 Yale L.J. 1897, 1903 (2005). 
3  Id. at 1936. 
4  Lawrence Lessig, Institutional Corruptions 1, (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For Ethics, Working Paper No. 1, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233582/. 
5  Id. at 14. 
6  LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST 15152, 23233 (2011). 
7  Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 
12 AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 564, 575 (2014). 
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inequality—that is, lawmakers’ dependence on the economic elite. However, despite the 
dedication of the Occupiers and substantial attention from the media, critics dismissed the 
movement once the Occupiers’ tents disappeared, claiming that the movement was 
unjustified, ineffective, and had achieved no immediate policy changes.8 But the point of 
Occupy Wall Street was never to demand particular policy changes; the point was to engage 
citizens and lawmakers on an issue affected by a democratic deficit. And in that respect, 
more than four years later, as we enter the heart of the 2016 election season, it is evident 
that Occupy Wall Street was both justified and successful. The movement was instrumental 
in the engagement of citizens and lawmakers on economic inequality and the corrupt 
dependence of lawmakers on the economic elite. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the meaning of civil disobedience 
and the circumstances under which civil disobedience can be justified in a democracy. Part 
II addresses institutional corruption and its relationship to democratic deficits. Part III 
explains how institutional corruption in the U.S. Congress has caused a democratic deficit. 
Finally, Part IV details the Occupy Wall Street movement and its ability to overcome a 
democratic deficit and put issues on the political agenda. 
 
I.  JUSTIFYING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN A DEMOCRACY 
Acts of civil disobedience have toppled oppressive regimes, vindicated human 
rights, and delivered dignity to the peoples of the world.9 And yet, no single understanding 
of civil disobedience has endured over time.10 This is due in part to the fact that civil 
disobedience is an elusive concept, represented by contradictory words—civil (connoting 
politeness, decency, or respectfulness), and disobedience (connoting waywardness, law 
breaking, or even sin).11 Inherent in this elusive concept is the paradox felt by those who 
want to respect the law but cannot accept all of its dictates.12 Howard Zinn provides a basic 
and relatively non-controversial starting point for analyzing this elusive and paradoxical 
concept—it is “the deliberate, discriminate, violation of law for a vital social purpose.”13 As 
such, civil disobedience is a means rather than an end.14 The purpose of civil disobedience 
is not simply to break the law; the purpose is to break the law in pursuit of a social goal.15 
Civil disobedience is useful in pursuing a social goal because it constitutes a higher level of 
                                                          
8  See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Occupy Wall Street: A Frenzy That Fizzled, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/occupy-wall-street-a-frenzy-that-fizzled/?_r=0. 
9  MALCOLM COXALL, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 22–23 (Guy Caswell ed., 2015). 
10  E.g., TONY MILLIGAN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: PROTEST, JUSTIFICATION, AND THE LAW 13 (2013); Matthew R. Hall, Guilty but 
Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil Disobedience and the Rule of Law, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2083, 2085 (2007). 
11  LEWIS PERRY, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, AN AMERICAN TRADITION 12 (2013). 
12  Id. at 1, 11. 
13  ZINN, supra note 1 at 119. 
14  AP Trichardt & HC Trichardt, Civil Disobedience and Jurisprudence, 19 Comp. & Int’l L.J. S. Afr. 357, 364 (1986). 
15  See ZINN, supra note 1 at 119; Trichardt & Trichardt, supra note 14, at 364. 
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dissent than legal protest—it entails an intensity that is absent from legal forms of 
expression.16 
Controversy surrounding civil disobedience stems primarily from the existence, or 
non-existence, of a citizen’s duty to obey the law. Most rationales supporting the existence 
of this duty also support the conclusion that the duty is stronger in a democracy than in an 
authoritarian regime. In contrast to an authoritarian regime, where the people lack a 
connection to the sovereign, democracy transforms individuals into members of a 
sovereign with which they identify and whose will they adopt as their own, even when they 
have been outvoted.17 Individual participants in a well-functioning democracy—that is, one 
that entails engagement, deliberation, and voting—can take authorship of the collective 
choices that the democratic process generates.18 Accordingly, while it is easy to approve of 
civil disobedience in an authoritarian regime where individual authorship of collective 
policy is unlikely, civil disobedience in a democracy requires special justification.19  
As Ronald Dworkin explains, a theory of justification for civil disobedience in a 
democracy should command agreement on what people can and should actually do, even 
in the face of disagreement about the wisdom or justice of the policies being advocated for 
or against.20 In other words, those engaging in civil disobedience must be careful not to 
base their asserted justification on the “rightness” of their position in an underlying 
controversy.21 Justification must turn on the kinds of convictions that an individual has, and 
not on the soundness of those convictions.22 If this principle is abandoned and the 
justification for disobedience turns on the soundness of what we think, then we cannot 
expect respect or opportunity from others who think that it is we who are unwise or 
unjust.23 Consistent with this rule, many scholars have focused on kinds of convictions and 
have argued that civil disobedience can in fact be justified in a democracy.24 Even amongst 
                                                          
16  HOWARD ZINN, THE ZINN READER: WRITINGS ON DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY 413 (2d ed. 2009); Markovits, supra note 
2, at 1935. 
17  Markovits, supra note 2, at 1912. 
18  Id. 
19  See MILLIGAN, supra note 10, at 145 (“We may not be required by a commitment to democracy to accept every decision 
of the majority but we may be required to justify our actions before the majority on those occasions when we refuse 
to do so.”); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 319 (Harvard Univ. ed. 2003); ZINN, supra note 16, at 413. 
20  RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 106 (1985).  
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. at 113. 
24  See, e.g., id. at 104–16; Markovits, supra note 2, at 1898–99; RAWLS, supra note 19, at 326; ZINN, supra note 16, at 413; 
see also MILLIGAN, supra note 10, at 138 (“Thoreau and King faced democracies (of a sort) but still recommended a 
limited violation of the law. Gandhi and Tolstoy faced more authoritarian forms of rule, but there is no suggestion 
in their writings that law-breaking was legitimate only because the State lacked democratic credentials.”); Vinit 
Haskar, The Right to Civil Disobedience, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 407, 413 (2003) (“Gandhi and Rawls both think that 
people have a right to civil disobedience, even in liberal democratic societies. . . .”). 
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these scholars, though, what kinds of convictions justify civil disobedience in a democracy 
is a contested point.25  
The traditional mode of justification for civil disobedience in a democracy is an 
appeal to majority-trumping considerations.26 Prominent writers, such as Henry David 
Thoreau, have invoked divine authority as a majority-trumping consideration.27 Others—
most notably John Rawls—have justified civil disobedience based on majority-trumping 
considerations that are secular in nature, such as fundamental human rights that pertain 
to basic liberties and equal protection.28 When democratic majorities violate fundamental 
human rights, those whose rights are violated (and those who make common cause with 
them) may engage in disobedience.29 An example of civil disobedience justified on this 
basis is the disobedience of the American civil rights movement, wherein citizens sought 
to secure basic liberties for and equal treatment of black Americans against white majorities 
that aimed to deny them those fundamental human rights.30 
Justification for civil disobedience, however, need not be tied to majority-trumping 
considerations.31 As Markovits explains, in a democracy, civil disobedience can be justified 
as a corrective measure when democratic processes break down, even when no majority-
trumping considerations apply.32 As mentioned above, democratic processes transform 
citizens from individuals into members of a democratic sovereign with whom they identify 
and whose will they adopt as their own, even when they have been outvoted.33 In order for 
democracy to reconcile individual and collective autonomy, it must provide mechanisms 
for aggregating the preferences of voters and foster an intensive engagement amongst 
citizens and lawmakers alike on issues of importance to the citizenry.34 When the 
engagement-enforcing mechanisms of democracy misfire, a “democratic deficit” results.35  
Citizens facing a democratic deficit have no democratic reason for accepting public 
policies or, for that matter, limiting themselves to legal mechanisms for generating 
engagement.36 The existence of a democratic deficit thus justifies civil disobedience to 
instigate engagement and overcome the deficit.37 Accordingly, where the majority-
                                                          
25  See MILLIGAN, supra note 10 at 137; Hall, supra note 10, at 2088. 
26  MILLIGAN, supra note 10, at 137–38. 
27  Id. at 137 (citing HENRY THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 403 (reprt. in Penguin Classics 1986)). 
28  Id. at 14; RAWLS, supra note 19, at 321, 337. 
29  RAWLS, supra note 19 at 326; ZINN, supra note 1 at 119 (arguing that civil disobedience “becomes not only justifiable 
but necessary when a fundamental human right is at stake, and when legal channels are inadequate for securing that 
right”) (emphasis added). 
30  DWORKIN, supra note 20 at 107-08; Markovits, supra note 2 at 1899. 
31  Markovits, supra note 2, at 1911. 
32  Id.; see also MILLIGAN, supra note 10, at 142–45. 
33  Markovits, supra note 2, at 1912. 
34  Id. at 1914, 1920. 
35  Id. at 1903. 
36  Id. at 1936. 
37  Id. at 1903; MILLIGAN, supra note 10, at 144 (“[C]onscientious law-breaking can be a corrective that enriches the 
political culture and contributes to our shared social world.”). 
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trumping justification for civil disobedience views civil disobedience as playing a limiting 
role in a democracy when majorities fail to vindicate divine authority or fundamental 
human rights, the democratic deficits justification for civil disobedience views civil 
disobedience as playing an enhancing role by promoting the engagement of democratic 
participants.38  
Civil disobedience aimed at correcting a democratic deficit is communicative in 
nature,39 but it also can be coercive—not in the sense that it coerces a non-consenting 
public to accept a collective policy, but in the sense that it coerces the public and lawmakers 
to put certain policies on the political agenda.40 In other words, while democracy-
enhancing civil disobedience cannot coerce an outcome (to do so would violate the 
democratic principles on which it rests), the disobedience may coerce engagement, with 
the possibility of such engagement resulting in a policy outcome that is supported by an 
informed and engaged majority of citizens and lawmakers.41 
This Article concerns institutional corruption, a particular source of a democratic 
deficit that justifies civil disobedience. 
 
II.  INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION AS A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
Many modern conceptions of corruption focus on “the improper use of public office 
for private purposes.”42 Within the universe of this definition, many forms of corruption 
have been identified.43 Notably, in 1995, Dennis F. Thompson refined the notion of 
“institutional corruption” in contrast to “individual corruption” in the context of legislative 
ethics.44 According to Thompson, individual corruption is the personal gain by a public 
official in exchange for promoting private interests, whereas institutional corruption is 
political gain by a public official under conditions that tend to promote private interests.45 
Unlike individual corruption, institutional corruption encompasses conduct that can be a 
                                                          
38  MILLIGAN, supra note 10 at 144 (“[L]aw-breaking can be a mechanism that works for democracy in the face of a legal 
system and a state machine that in insufficiently democratic.”); Markovits, supra note 2, at 1902. 
39  COXALL, supra note 9, at 32. 
40  Markovits, supra note 2, at 1941. 
41  Id.; Hall, supra note 10, at 2087 (“The civilly disobedient act must hope to provoke change through the public debate 
and decision, instead principally to block or thwart the disfavored law or policy; although secondarily, the protest 
may have that effect.”). 
42  See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 7 & n.36 (1995); Helping 
Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, WORLD BANK GROUP, 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm (last visited May 22, 2016) (“We settled 
on a straightforward definition—the abuse of public office for private gain.”). 
43  See, e.g., M. Patrick Yingling, Conventional and Unconventional Corruption, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 263, 264–71 (2013); M. 
Patrick Yingling & Mohamed A. ‘Arafa, After the Revolution: Egypt’s Changing Forms of Corruption, 2 U. Balt. J. Int’l 
L. 23, 28–34 (2014). 
44  THOMPSON, supra note 42, at 30; Lessig, supra note 4, at 4–5. 
45  THOMPSON, supra note 42, at 30; Lessig, supra note 4, at 4–5. 
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necessary part of a lawmaking institution’s duties, but nonetheless contributes to an 
institution’s deviation from its purpose.46 
Building on Thompson’s writings, Lessig recently presented his own idea of 
institutional corruption in the form of campaign finance reform in the United States. He 
defines institutional corruption as “the consequence of an influence within an economy of 
influence that illegitimately weakens the effectiveness of an institution especially by 
weakening the public trust of the institution.”47 The notion of an “institutional purpose” is 
not expressly mentioned in this formulation, but the role of an institutional purpose is 
implied by Lessig’s statement that an influence can weaken the “effectiveness” of an 
institution.48 In order to determine whether an institution’s effectiveness has been 
weakened, an “institutional purpose” baseline is required.49 With respect to this baseline, 
M.E. Newhouse explains that institutional corruption refers to the institution’s deviation 
from the purpose for which it is obliged to act—its obligatory purpose.50 Because 
lawmakers coerce the people through laws, the activities of lawmakers harm the people 
unless the lawmakers act for the people’s purpose, and thus the people’s purpose must serve 
as the baseline for evaluating a lawmaking institution’s effectiveness.51  
If a lawmaking institution is not acting for the people by, for example, failing to 
engage on issues of importance to the people, the problem often lies in the fact that the 
institution is suffering from an improper dependence.52 Although a dependence on the 
people is proper, an improper dependence (on something or someone other than the 
people) primes the institution for corruption.53 If the institution develops an improper 
dependence, then even perfectly benign institutional behavior becomes part of the 
institutional corruption.54 Lessig provides a helpful metaphor to understand an improper 
institutional dependence:  
 
Think of a compass whose arrow is pointing towards magnetic north, then imagine a 
magnet drawn close to the compass. The magnet draws the arrow away from the direction 
in which it was designed to point. That deviation in a literal sense is a kind of corruption.55  
 
                                                          
46  THOMPSON, supra note 42, at 7. 
47  Lessig, supra note 4, at 1 (citing THOMPSON, supra note 42, at 30; Dennis Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, 1 
(Edmond J. Safra Ctr. For Ethics, Working Paper No. 16, 2010); see also M.E. Newhouse, Institutional Corruption: A 
Fiduciary Theory, 23 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 553, 554 (2014). 
48  Newhouse, supra note 47, at 554. 
49  Id. at 555. 
50  Id. at 579. 
51  Id. at 562. 
52  Lessig, supra note 4, at 14; see also ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX 
TO CITIZENS UNITED 53 (2014). 
53  Lessig, supra note 4, at 16. 
54  Id. at 15. 
55  Lawrence Lessig, Institutional Corruption Defined, J. L. MED. & ETHICS 553, 553 (2013); LESSIG, supra note 6, at 19, 20; 
see also UChicago Div. of the Humanities, Lawrence Lessig on Institutional Corruption—Finance, 10.23.14. Lecture 2 
of 5, YOUTUBE (Oct. 27, 2014), https://youtu.be/x_UhsM-RVPg/. 
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If the magnetic deviation is small enough, then one might believe that the compass 
remains true. But it is not true. However subtle the bias might be, it is nonetheless a 
corruption—the compass is not effective; it is not functioning according to its purpose.56 
When a lawmaking institution is not functioning according to its purpose—the people’s 
purpose—then the people lose their connection to the sovereign. They can no longer 
identify with the sovereign and adopt the will of the sovereign as their own.57 As a 
consequence of this institutional corruption, citizens also face a democratic deficit, and 
citizens facing a democratic deficit have no democratic reason for accepting public policies 
that result from the deficit or, for that matter, limiting themselves to legal mechanisms for 
generating engagement.58  
The next part of this Article addresses an example of a country—the United States—
facing a democratic deficit due to institutional corruption.  
 
III.  INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 As explained in Part II, some institutions have an institutional purpose—the 
purpose for which the institution’s activities must be conducted in order to avoid harming 
others.59 Because legislators coerce the people through their laws, their activities harm the 
people unless they act for the people’s purpose, and thus a lawmaking institution is obliged 
to act for the people’s purpose.60 The drafters of the U.S. Constitution recognized this 
characteristic of lawmaking institutions. As Lessig points out, the Federalist Papers show 
us that the U.S. Congress was created to be “dependent upon the People alone.”61 
Over time, however, Congress lost this intended dependence and developed an 
improper dependence. Instead of being dependent upon the people, Congress became 
dependent upon the funders—the very small percentage of the public with the ability and 
willingness to fund election campaigns.62 This improper dependence developed slowly over 
time, but became radically more intense at the end of the twentieth century. At the same 
time that demand for winning was increasing, the costs of campaigns were skyrocketing. 
These two changes together put a burden on every member of Congress to excel in 
fundraising.63 As such, many well-meaning elected officials in Congress found themselves 
with a strong incentive to engage on issues for the benefit of the funders in contrast to the 
people.64  
                                                          
56  LESSIG, supra note 6, at 20. 
57  See Markovits, supra note 2, at 1912. 
58  Id. at 1936. 
59  Newhouse, supra note 47, at 562. 
60  Id. 
61  LESSIG, supra note 6, at 128 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 328 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); 
Lessig, supra note 4, at 13. 
62  LESSIG, supra note 6, at 232–33; TEACHOUT, supra note 52, at 10; Yingling, supra note 43, at 286–90. 
63  LESSIG, supra note 6, at 95. 
64  Yingling, supra note 43, at 269. 
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It is important to recognize that the funders are not the people.65 The evidence is in 
the numbers. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, during the 2013-2014 election 
cycle, where approximately $2.77 billion was contributed in an effort to elect federal 
candidates, only 0.23% of the American population (722,619 of 310,823,152) contributed at 
least $200 to federal candidates, political action committees, or political parties.66 
Moreover, only 0.04% of the American population (126,933 of 310,823,152) contributed at 
least $2,600, the maximum amount that can be contributed to any single candidate for 
federal office.67 And finally, only 0.009% of the American population (27,727 of 310,823,152) 
contributed at least $10,000.68 These 27,727 individuals—who constitute less than 1% of 1% 
of the population, yet accounted for approximately 31% of all contributions to federal 
candidates, political action committees, and political parties69—are the relevant funders, 
and candidates have become increasingly dependent on this small subset of the population 
as a whole.70  
It is equally important to recognize that the funders are unlikely to be representative 
of the people or aligned with the interests of the people.71 To illustrate, if Congress focused 
on serving 27,727 random individuals within the United States, there would be at least a 
possibility that these 27,727 people would be representative of the people or aligned with 
the interests of the people; the 27,727 would likely come from all walks of life and have 
divergent economic and social interests, just like the people. But the funders do not come 
from all walks of life. They are not random; they are the economic elite. And while the 
economic elite certainly can attempt to represent the interests of the people, most of the 
economic elite represent the interests of the economic elite.72 Economic self-interest, 
including the prosperity of one’s family and peer group, is a universal human motivator.73 
                                                          
65  Lessig, supra note 4, at 13, 15; Lawrence Lessig, We the People, and the Republic we must reclaim, TEDTALK (Feb. 2013), 
https://ted.com/talks/lawrence_lessig_we_the_people_and_the_republic_we_must_reclaim/. 
66  2014 Overview, Donor Demographics, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL.,   
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/donordemographics.php (last visited May 22, 2016). 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  The Center for Responsive Politics’ report on the 2013-2014 election cycle indicates that the total amount contributed 
by those who contributed $200 or more was $1,667,300,000, which constituted 66.6% of all contributions to federal 
candidates, political action committees, and parties. The report also indicates that the total amount contributed by 
those who contributed $10,000 or more was $778,800,000. The $778,800,000 constitutes approximately 31.1% of all 
contributions to federal candidates, political action committees, and parties. See Donor Demographics, CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/donordemographics.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); see also 
Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising 
Inequality?, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2013, at 103, 111 (reporting on the 2012 election cycle and showing that “the share of 
total income received by the top 0.01 percent of households is about 5 percent but that the share of campaign 
contributions made by the top 0.01 percent of the voting age population is now over 40 percent.”). 
70  See Bonica, et al., supra note 69, at 113. 
71  Lessig, supra note 4, at 13, 15. 
72  See Lessig, supra note 65; Noam Scheiber & Patricia Cohen, For the Wealthiest, Private Tax System Saves Them 
Billions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/30/business/economy/for-the-wealthiest-
private-tax-system-saves-them-billions.html/. 
73  See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 2 (1999). 
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The conclusion that Congress has developed an improper dependence and that this 
improper dependence has caused a democratic deficit is more than a presumption based 
on campaign finance statistics; empirical analysis of policy decisions in the United States 
supports this conclusion. Notably, in 2014, Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page published the 
largest empirical study of policy decisions by the U.S. government in the history of political 
science.74 Gilens and Page analyzed the policy preferences of different groups within 
American society (including average economic citizens, economic elite, mass-based 
interest groups, and business interest groups) and found that “economic elites” and 
“organized business interests” have a highly significant, independent impact on policy.75 
When economic elites and organized business interests support a particular policy change, 
there is a likelihood that the particular policy change will occur.76  
The same cannot be said for average Americans. According to Gilens and Page, 
“[w]hen the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are 
controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a miniscule, 
near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy.”77 In other words, it does 
not matter whether five percent of average Americans or ninety-five percent of average 
Americans support the policy change—the preferences of average Americans for a policy 
change are of no consequence independent of whether the change is also supported by the 
economic elite or organized business interests.78  
Thus, there is evidence that (1) the relevant funders of election campaigns are the 
economic elite, (2) these economic elite are not representative of the people, and 
(3) lawmakers are responsive to the preferences of the economic elite over the people. 
Nonetheless, some might question whether this evidence allows one to conclude that there 
is a democratic deficit. After all, the American people still have the final say on their elected 
officials in Congress—if certain representatives fail to engage on issues for the benefit of 
the people, then the people can simply vote those representatives out of power.79 This is an 
important point, but it is also important to recognize that the people receive an 
opportunity to exercise their final say on their elected officials only after the candidates 
have persuaded a significant portion of the one-percent-of-the-one-percent to fund their 
campaigns. A candidate who cannot persuade the funders often lacks the means to catch 
the people’s attention when it comes time to vote. The people have the final say on 
candidates in the general election, but candidates only receive a real chance to run in the 
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general election if they do well in the funder’s election, and the funder’s election is only for 
the economic elite.80 
The inputs and outputs from Congress indicate that the institution is not fulfilling 
its obligatory purpose to act for the people, and thus Congress is suffering from 
institutional corruption. And with the institutional corruption comes a democratic deficit. 
The democratic processes that should foster engagement and allow individuals to take 
authorship of collective choices, even when they are outvoted, are broken. As explained in 
Part I, citizens facing a democratic deficit have no democratic reason for accepting public 
policies affected by the deficit or, for that matter, limiting themselves to legal mechanisms 
for generating engagement.81 The existence of a democratic deficit thus justifies civil 
disobedience to instigate engagement.82 
The next Part highlights an example of civil disobedience aimed at engagement on 
an issue affected by a democratic deficit. 
 
IV.  CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE TO OVERCOME INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 
Occupy Wall Street was a people-powered movement that began on September 17, 
2011 in Manhattan’s Zuccotti Park.83 The movement’s participants were not concerned with 
vindicating a divine or secular majority-trumping consideration; rather, as stated by the 
organizers at OccupyWallStreet.org, the movement was about “fighting back against the 
corrosive power of major banks and multinational corporations over the democratic 
process” as well as “the role of Wall Street in creating an economic collapse that has caused 
the greatest recession in generations.”84 The Occupiers were displeased with how things 
had been sorted out following the 2008 collapse on Wall Street.85 Wall Street banks, along 
with some of corporate America, had received massive government bailouts, while working 
class families received very little in relief.86 The one percent had been saved while the 
ninety-nine percent continued to suffer.87  
Occupy Wall Street was a theoretical movement represented by a literal 
encampment. Initially, a small number of protestors from a variety of backgrounds camped 
out in the park by night while a slightly larger number of protestors blocked traffic by day.88 
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Before long, Zuccotti Park was filled with thousands of “Occupiers.”89 Although the 
Occupiers were primarily concerned with economic inequality, they also recognized the 
deeper problem of a broken democracy, where individuals cannot take authorship of 
collective decisions.90 As such, the Occupiers sought to demonstrate the ideals of 
participatory democracy in their own collective decision-making by using “General 
Assemblies” to facilitate “an open, participatory and horizontally organized process” to 
build the capacity to constitute themselves in public as an autonomous collective force.91 
The Occupiers also engaged in acts of civil disobedience—breaking laws, such as 
those concerning trespassing and blocking traffic—to bring intensity to their message.92 
The police responded with typical urban control tactics, subjecting protestors to “kettling,” 
the forceful partition of crowds into easily controllable groups followed by the confinement 
of each group, often behind a wall of police officers brandishing riot shields.93 On 
September 24, 2011, during the movement’s second week, a peaceful march was met by 
police intimidation, and pepper spray was not spared.94 Police arrested eighty protestors, 
mostly for blocking traffic.95 Eventually, over the next few weeks and months, Zuccotti Park 
was cleared amid more arrests and more pepper spray.96  
Critics of Occupy Wall Street dismissed the movement as ineffective.97 Within a 
year, media outlets were using the words “fizzled” and “failure” on a regular basis.98 If 
immediate policy changes were the goal of Occupy Wall Street, then it was a failure. But 
the movement never had such goals, and famously so. One frequent observation of Occupy 
Wall Street from the beginning was its lack of specific demands.99 The point of Occupy 
Wall Street was not to demand a particular policy change; the point was to start a 
conversation.100 And in this respect, Occupy Wall Street was anything but a failure—the 
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movement was instrumental in the public’s engagement on the issue of economic 
inequality.101 For decades, many factions warned about the plague of economic inequality 
in America, but it was Occupy Wall Street that initiated a real conversation about how and 
why the richest 400 Americans have more wealth than the bottom 150 million combined.102 
Although the Occupy tents are now gone, the movement has had a lasting effect on 
American consciousness and politics.103 Notably, in 2013, Bill de Blasio made wealth 
inequality a central issue of his mayoral campaign, vowing to confront the “Tale of Two 
Cities” that he said defined New York City.104 And the 2016 race for the presidency is 
currently robust with discussion about economic inequality. Markedly, Democratic 
contender Senator Bernie Sanders is running a campaign that has roots deeply embedded 
in the Occupy movement.105 His number one issue: economic inequality. The Sanders 
campaign website reads, “[t]he issue of wealth and income inequality is the great moral 
issue of our time, it is the great economic issue of our time, and it is the great political issue 
of our time.”106 And now, former Senator and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—the 
Democratic front-runner who has been criticized for her close relationship with Wall 
Street—has followed Bernie Sanders into Occupy territory, giving speeches across the 
country, rattling off an array of statistics on rising inequality and falling economic mobility 
in America.107 
These candidates are speaking not only about economic inequality; they are 
speaking about the root cause of the inequality—a campaign finance system that has 
facilitated the corruption of the U.S. Congress. Both Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton 
have referred to the political system as “corrupt” and have vowed to fight for: (1) a 
constitutional amendment that would allow Congress and the states to regulate money in 
elections; (2) legislation establishing a public-financing system of campaigns; and (3) rules 
requiring complete transparency for campaign contributions and expenditures.108  
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And this “corrupt” political system is not necessarily a partisan issue. This election 
cycle also has seen Republicans criticize the role of money in politics.109 Former presidential 
candidate Senator Lindsey Graham called for a movement “to control the money in 
politics.”110 Also, presidential candidate Donald Trump, a billionaire and former contributor 
himself, has called the U.S. campaign finance system “broken.” As Trump stated in a 
Republican debate: 
 
I gave to many people before this—before two months ago I was a businessman. I give to 
everybody. When they call, I give. And you know what, when I need something from them 
two years later, three years later, I call them. They are there for me. That’s a broken 
system.111 
 
These are unprecedented statements by presidential candidates. Occupy Wall 
Street—and the acts of civil disobedience aimed at engaging the public and elected 
representatives on issues of inequality and institutional corruption—instigated this current 
political activity. Without the intensity of the civil disobedience witnessed during Occupy 
Wall Street, it is highly unlikely that lawmakers and presidential candidates would have 
engaged in conversation regarding issues of economic inequality or the corrupting effect of 
money in politics. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Before we dismiss Occupy Wall Street as an ineffective movement composed of 
radicals who failed to understand the meaning of civil disobedience, we need to recognize 
that civil disobedience can be justified as a democracy-enhancing measure, even when 
majority-trumping considerations are absent. Citizens, such as the Occupiers, who face a 
democratic deficit (caused by institutional corruption or otherwise) have no democratic 
reason for accepting public policies or, for that matter, limiting themselves to approved 
legal mechanisms for generating engagement. Through civil disobedience, citizens can 
instigate engagement on an issue and call attention to a democratic deficit. And with time, 
engagement can lead to real policy change. In this respect, Occupy Wall Street was a 
success. But the story is not yet finished. The engagement of citizens and lawmakers on the 
issue of economic inequality and the improper dependence of Congress on the economic 
elite is still occurring. The narrative of Occupy Wall Street is still being written. 
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